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RECENT CASES
PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(a)-
TYPICALITY REQUIREMENT FOR CLASS ACTIONS REVIEWED.
Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
four prerequisites to a class action.' Subdivision (a) (3) of the Rule
requires that "claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Several recent cases
indicate the existence of a trend to reinterpret the ",typicality" require-
ment, inspired by the proposition that it has been accorded an inade-
quate role in class action certifications.
Renewed interest in defining the parameters of typicality began
in the Colorado district court with White v. Gates Rubber Co.' There
the court refused certification of a class action in which the plaintiff
sought to represent certain minority members [allegedly] discharged
because of race or color.8  The court ruled that to satisfy the
'typicality requirement of Rule 23(a), a plaintiff first "must demon-
strate that other members of the class . . . have suffered the same or
similar grievances." 4  Although it can be construed as dicta to the
case,5 the Tenth Circuit, in Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,6 has
apparently adopted this rule along with other general language con-
tained in the White opinion.7
1. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a) states that:
One or more members of a class may sue . . . as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
2. 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
3. Initially, White sought to bring an across the board attack against the
company's hiring, promotion and discharge practices on behalf of all past, present and
future Negro and Spanish surnamed employees. Prior to its discussion of typicality,
the district court held that the plaintiff could not adequately represent such a broad
class since he was neither aggrieved by the company's hiring or employment practices
nor did he have a sufficient stake in the outcome since he did not seek reemployment.
53 F.R.D. at 414.
4. 53 F.R.D. at 415.
5. See note 10 infra.
6. 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
7. Several other courts have adopted the general language of the White case.
Taylor involved a state-wide challenge to allegedly discriminato-
ry employment practices instituted 'by a former employee of Safeway's
frozen food warehouse in Denver. The plaintiff sought to represent a
class comprised of all past, present and future Negro employees of
Safeway's wholesale, retail and distribution facilities throughout Colo-
rado. Initially, the district court certified ,the class as complying with
all the requirements of Rule 23, -including the interpretation of typi-
cality as formulated in White.' Fifteen months later, however, the
district limited the class to those Negroes employed at the Denver
warehouse. After a trial on the merits, the court of appeals held that
the district court had properly limited the class since plaintiff "failed
to show the existence of any discriminatory employment practices
. . . or the existence of any similarly aggrieved Safeway employee
outside the warehouse." 9
The appellate court's opinion focused on the narrow issue of
whether the district court properly limited the class to a single ware-
house in contrast to a state-wide or company-wide class.'" It is
important to note that the plaintiff had a substantial opportunity to
engage in wide ranging discovery prior to the order to limit the class;
however, the opinion does not indicate what the plaintiff was able to
demonstrate. It is possible that discovery indicated no company-
wide policies for hiring or promotion and therefore no discrim-
inatory pattern." If so, limiting the class to the Denver ware-
house would have been proper under traditional principles. 2
The court of appeals, however, chose to assert a different rationale. It
found as determinative the plaintiff's failure to show the existence of
any "discriminatory employment practices . . . outside the frozen
Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361, 372 (D.S.C. 1974); Mason v. Calgon Corp., 63
F.R.D. 98, 106 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 62
F.R.D. 370, 375 (D.S.C. 1974); Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 62 F.R.D. 434,
436 (E.D. Mo. 1973); see also Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 99
(D.D.C. 1973).
8. 333 F. Supp. 83 (D. Colo. 1971).
9. 524 F.2d at 270.
10. Having drawn the issue in this manner, at least one author believes that the
court of appeals' extensive discussion of typicality can be considered dicta to the
case. Letter from Herbert B. Newberg, April 2, 1976.
11. At trial, plaintiffs class action challenged three of Safeway's hiring and
employment practices: a word of mouth or employee referral system, a work
experience requirement for hiring, and a prohibition against transfers from Safeway's
warehouses and retail stores. At the time that plaintiff was hired, it was clear that
Safeway's hiring practices were decentralized. It is not clear whether the last practice
challenged, the transfer prohibition, involved a centralized policy decision.
12. In Jones v. United Gas 'Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
plaintiffs sought to represent employees at all of defendant's facilities. The court re-
duced the class to include only employees of the two facilities in which plaintiffs were
employed since policy formulation relating to employment and personnel practices
was decentralized, as partially evidenced by the fact that different unions represented
employees at other facilities. See also note 24 infra.
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food warehouse ... ." Since the ultimate issue was whether the
alleged practices were discriminatory, this statement seems to require
a preliminary showing of the merits of the plaintiffs case, a practice
which has been held reversible error."3
The court of appeals also emphasized the fact that Taylor failed
to demonstrate the existence of any similarily aggrieved employee
outside the warehouse. 14  This fact is significant because of the
court's interpretation of the meaning of "typicality."'1 5 Both the
White and Taylor courts note that in Rule 23(a), typicality is accord-
ed equal status with the other elements, particularly commonality'
and representivity.17  After reviewing the cases on the subject, both
courts expressed the belief that -the typicality requirement has been
too lightly considered. Many courts treat it as synonymous with
either the (a)(2) requirement of commonality 8 or the (a)(4) re-
quirement of representivity,'9 while others ignore it completely.2 °
White and Taylor reason that since typicality is a separate element of
the Rule, it must 'be accorded an "independent significance." The
13. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Ala., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
rev'g, 4 F.E.P. 740 (N.D. Ala. 1971). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 177 (1974), where the court stated, in another context:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class ac-
tion . ..
Quoted in 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 1032 (1976); see also
Newberg, Burdens of Proof for Class Issues, 3 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 103 (1974);
Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970);
Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 159 (D.N.J. 1974).
14. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270 (10th Cir. 1975); see
also note 9 and accompanying text supra.
15. The court of appeals in Taylor expressly adopted White, stating that "The
White definition of typicality has done no more than verbalize an implicit require-
ment of subsection (a)(3); therefore, we must conclude that this definition is
correct." 524 F.2d at 270.
16. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2).
17. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
18. Citing Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968); Hyatt v.
United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 247 (D. Conn. 1970); see also 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1763 (1972).
19. Citing Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 124 (W.D. Va. 1970); Weiss v.
Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 47 F.R.D. 60, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D.
465, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1764 (1972); Clarke & Meredith, Class Actions Instituted for
Violations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, EXCERPTS FROM PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 6TH CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 15-
18, 1974, reported at 66 F.R.D. 341, 352.
20. Citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
only interpretation that the Taylor court could perceive, to create such
independence, required a demonstration that plaintiff's claims
were similar to those of actually existent individuals.
Although it is difficult to dispute the idea that each element of a
rule should have some meaning, the proposition that every element
must be autonomic does not necessarily follow. Other courts have
recognized that significant meaning does not preclude some overlap
between the various elements of Rule 23(a). For example, in Som-
mers v. Abraham Lincoln Federal S & L Assoc.,21 the court pointed
out that while subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) are both intended to
insure that plaintiffs will fully present the claims of the class mem-
bers, this in no way means that they are synonymous.22 Rather,
[t]he typicality requirement insures that no class member's claim
or significant aspects of that claim will go unrepresented by
plaintiffs; the 'adequate representation' requirement insures that
plaintiffs' interests are co-extensive with [those of] the class
members, and that no conflicts of interest exist. While these re-
quirements overlap considerably, they are not redundant since
situations are conceivable where plaintiffs and class members
have similar claims but not co-extensive interests .... 23
Although a somewhat closer relationship exists between the elements
of commonality and typicality they have likewise been interpreted as
having a separate significance. In Taliaferro v. State Council of
Higher Education24 the court explained that commonality requires
that the questions of law or fact presented are shared by the members
of the purported class, while typicality demands that the disputed
issues occupy essentially the same degree of centrality to their own
21. 66 F.R.D. 581 ('E.D. Pa. 1975) (alleging a conspiracy in violation
of the Sherman Act by mortgage writing institution that required prepayments into
escrow, without interest, of taxes, insurance and other assessments, held that the class
should be subdivided since extensive class discovery demonstrated sufficient factual
differences that could prevent plaintiff's claims from typifying those of the class as a
whole).
22. Contra Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 269-70 (10th Cir.
1975), in which the court stated:
Because of its source in the original rule, subsection (a)(3) should logically
deal with the adequacy of representation, but due to the broad language of
subsection (a) (4) that a representative must 'fairly and adequately' repre-
sent the class, it is difficult to attach a meaning to (a) (3) that is not in-
cluded or does not overlap somewhat with subsection (a) (4).
See also 3B MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE T 23.06-2 at 23-325.
23. 66 F.R.D. at 587. The court exemplified this interrelation by a racial
discrimination suit in which the representative plaintiffs are given the promotions
which the complaint alleges all class members were discriminatorily denied.
24. 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974). Plaintiff, alleging discriminatory
promotion practices, sought to represent women instructors at universities purportedly
controlled by the state council. The class was limited to the one university where
plaintiff was employed because there was no connective link or centralized policy
with regard to promotion practices nor was a conspiracy alleged. Compare Gilbert v.
General Electric Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973), in which the same court
certified a nationwide class of present and past female employees affected by the
company's pregnancy policies, which were uniform throughout the nation.
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claim as to that of the other members of the purported class. This
[is] intended to afford protection to the members of the plaintiff
and defendant classes by insuring them against the unwarranted
and unnecessary involvement of each in the adjudication of
legal rights and against representation in actions in which they
do have a stake by representatives who do not or whose stake
is dissimilar.
25
Taylor not only assumes that each element of Rule 23(a) should
operate independently, but also asserts that the plaintiff's demonstra-
tion of the existence of other aggrieved individuals provides the sole
technique for achieving such independence. The court impliedly
asserts that its interpretation of commonality and representativity do
not overlap and therefore absorb what should be considered the
proper subject of typicality. This reasoning is suspect. The court
should have analyzed the functional relationships among the various
elements of Rule 23 before grounding its decision on the simplistic
principle of independent significance.
Rather than interpret the parameters of typicality, White and
Taylor have in reality grafted an entirely new requirement into the
Rule.2 A plaintiff must prove the actual existence of aggrieved
members of the purported class.27  The general purpose of a class
25. 372 F. Supp. at 1387. The White court rejected this approach, stating that
rather than determining whether the typicality and common question re-
quirements are met, courts have concluded, from a finding that a common
question would exist if there were claims throughout the class, that the
claims are typical. In other words, the fact that hypothetical claims would
be similar is considered sufficient justification for finding the plaintiff's
claim to be typical.
53 F.R.D. at 415. This interpretation presumes that the plaintiff is required to be a
member of the class, a presumption which appears to be invalid. 1 H. NEWBERO,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACIONS §§ 1030-1082 (1976); see also note 41 infra.
26. This may be improper. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),
prohibits a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether
it may be maintained as a class action. See note 13 supra. "The same rationale
• . . applies generally whenever one travels astray to determine the propriety of a
class action . . . by any test independent of the requirements set forth in Rule 23,
itself." 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACToNs § 1032 (1976).
27. According to White, this demonstration may be made in any number of
ways, including but not limited to affidavits and enumerated charges filed with the
EEOC. In Taylor the district court initially certified plaintiff's class action, holding
that the typicality requirement had been satisfied by corroborating testimony gathered
from other employees at the Denver warehouse by the EEOC investigator, as well as
by the commission's broad characterization of the issue as involving racial discrimina-
tion rather than enumerating plaintiff's individual grievances. The corroborating
testimony, as reported, related solely to plaintiff's individual claim of discrimina-
tion by his supervisor. Although such an interpretation can be rationalized on the
basis of the general rule that Rule 23 should be liberally interpreted, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Industries
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98 (D. Colo. 1971), particularly in the early stages of litigation,
action is to dispose of legal claims "of a multitude of litigants without
the necessity of separate prosecutorial participation by each plain-
tiff. '" 28  The class action requirements serve the dual function of
protecting both courts and litigants from misuse of the class action
device. 29  This dual function is not advanced by requiring a showing
of actually, as opposed to hypothetically, similar grievances.8 ° It may
be contended that such a requirement will save defendants from
unwarranted discovery costs. Where, however, the complaint alleges
a pattern and practice of discrimination, the rule has a prejudicial
effect on plaintiffs by requiring what is, essentially, a preliminary
showing of the merits of the case. This contravenes the general
principle that any doubt concerning the propriety of a class action
should be resolved in favor of certifying the class.3 1 Additionally, in
a proper case, the courts already have the ability to cut off unwarrant-
ed discovery 2 under the common question requirement.
From the plaintiff's perspective, the imposition of the additional
requirement will create problems ranging from substantial hardship
to mere inconvenience. It is easy to conceive of situations in which
potential members of a purported class are unaware of either their
rights or the pending class action,33 thus requiring a substantial
outlay of capital by the plaintiff to insure certification. These factors
could preclude the initiation of otherwise meritorious class actions. In
cases in which the plaintiff's success in his individual claim automat-
ically insures success of the class action3 4 as, for example, in a de-
claratory suit challenging the lack of due process in a state's self-
help repossession statute, the additional requirement can only be a
nuisance. Requiring the plaintiff to find other individuals who have
Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment Co., 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. 111. 1969), it
eradicates the White rule, and moreover, places the emphasis on the merits of the
plaintiff's individual claim.
28. Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Education, 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1387
(E.D. Va. 1974).
29. Id.
30. See Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1972); Sullivan v.
Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 370 (D.S.C. 1974); Green v. Missouri Pa-
cific R.R. Co., 62 F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
31. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969); Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970).
32. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Education, 372 F. Supp.
1378, 1387-88 (E.D. Va. 1974) (class was limited where defendant universities had
no prior contact with the named plaintiff and ran the risk of having to submit to
extensive discovery without any specific claim having been made against them).
33. In some cases potential class members may hesitate to come forward due to
fear of renewed harassment. See generally Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096 (4th
Cir. 1972); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361 (D.S.C. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich.
1974); see also Cottrell v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 62 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Va.
1974) (utility service termination procedures); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59




signed security agreements and are in default adds nothing in the way
of protection to the class or the defendant.
Moreover, if typicality requires that other individuals come for-
ward and assert that they personally feel aggrieved,"5 then the Taylor
and White courts are asserting an interpretation which elsewhere has
been soundly rejected. In Cottrell v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co.,"6 plaintiffs alleged due process violations in utility service termi-
nation procedures. Defendants asserted that plaintiffs' claims were
not typical of the class since some individuals might not feel ag-
grieved or might even prefer unlawful procedures when compared
to any increase in the cost of utility service. The court rejected this
argument, along with a line of cases3 7 that supported it, stating:
'"Typicalness" is -not a subjective test, authorizing a judge
to dismiss a class action based on a substantial legal claim where
he thinks some of the members of the class may prefer to leave
a violation of rights unremedied.'aa .. . Once the plaintiffs have
• . . [complied with (a) (2)] . . . , -they need show only . ..
[a common issue] .. .occupying essentially the same position in
their claim as in the claims of the unnamed members.
38
The result should not be different if every person other than the
plaintiff opposed the action.
The Taylor opinion, on the other hand, emphasizes that "White
ruled that subsection (a)(3) at least requires that class action plain-
35. Such an interpretation can easily be extrapolated from both the purpose of
the rule stated in White and Taylor, which is to insure that there is a class in need of
representation, Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270 (10th Cir. 1975);
White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (1971), and White's requirement of
affidavits or enumerated EEOC charges, 53 F.R.D. at 415.
36. 62 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Va. 1974).
37. Id. at 520. This court expressly repudiated the subjective approach of the
courts in Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v.
Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated 409 U.S. 815
(1972); Wilson v. Kelly, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Ward v. Luttrell,
292 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. La. 1968).
In Ihrke, also involving a due process attack to utility service termination pro-
cedures the court stated that:
[I]t is highly unlikely that the claim . . .that a hearing should be required
. . .prior to termination is typical of the claims of the class. It is likely
that some customers . . . would feel that the additional expense of such a
procedure, if it is indeed required, could conceivably result in a rate in-
crease to all customers, and that this would not be considered desirable by
all of the subscribers ...
459 F.2d at 572-73. See also Linker v. Unified School Dist. 259, Wichita, Kansas,
344 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Kan. 1972), an action to enjoin the operation of a desegrega-
tion agreement, in which the court held that the plaintiff's claims were not typical
since some members of the community favored the plan.
37a. Citing 3B MOORE'S FEERAL PRACTicE 23-327.
38. 62 F.R.D. at 520.
tiffs establish that 'there is, in fact, a class needing representation' -3
and "it is not unreasonable to require the plaintiff to establish the
existence of a class as premilinary to . . . [a] . . .comparison
of claims and defenses."4  White's concern with the failure of other
courts to provide any significant distinction between the common
question requirement and typicality rests in its belief that two addi-
tional requirements are implied in Rule 12(a): an identifiable class
must exist and the representative must be a member of the class.4 '
From such a starting point, it would be difficult to discern any
independent significance in the typicality requirement. These im-
plied requirements have been retained from the pre-1966 Rule 23,
and serve no purpose in the current rule. As one commentator has
stated,
[o]ne need not have a class to maintain a class action under
amended Rule 23. . . . Functional tests have replaced any re-
quirement for the existence of a class and membership in
the class. Rather than some existential class with a deter-
minate membership, the only common bond among class mem-
bers required under new Rule 23 is a common legal controversy,
measured by the presence of common questions of fact or law.
One who shares this common controversy, that is, where claims
are typical of other persons, and who otherwise satisfies thresh-
old individual standing requirements, is prima facie eligible to
represent the class, assuming the other prerequisites of Rule 23
are satisfied.
42
It should be noted that even if it is proper to require the plaintiff to
show the existence of an actual class, a showing of only one similarly
situated individual does not go very far towards complying with the
Rule. Yet this result would apparently satisfy the White court.
Moreover, in Taylor, it is not clear that the plaintiff satisfied this
requirement even with regard to the class limited to the Denver
warehouse.4 a
Several courts have presently adopted at least the general lan-
guage of White v. Gates Rubber Co.44 relating to the independence of
the various elements of Rule 23(a). It is suggested that prior to the
39. 524 F.2d at 270.
40. id.
41. These have often been characterized as implied requirements of Rule 23(a).
Clarke & Meredith, Class Actions Instituted for Violations of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, EXCERPTS FROM PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
6TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 15-18, 1974, reported at 66
F.R.D. 341, 352; C. WRimH & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1764
(1972).
42. 1 H. NEWBERO, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 1030 (1976).
43. See note 20 supra. It is not at all clear that the corroborating testimony
related to any of Taylor's class claims. If this is in fact the case, it is difficult to
understand how these claims could meet the typicality test as stated.
44. See note 7 supra.




adoption of this, or any similar approach, a court should undertake
an independent analysis of the functional relationships among the
elements of the Rule and attempt to re-evaluate and refine both the
general language and its applicability in specific factual settings.
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES-UsE OF QUOTAS TO REMEDY Dis-
CRIMINATION BY PUBLIC EMPLOYERS-Kirkland v. New York
State Department of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d
Cir. 1975).
In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional
Services,' two Black officers, joined by the Brotherhood of New York
State Corrections Officers, filed suit under sections 1981 and 19832
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enjoin the application of a dis-
criminatory examination used to determine promotion to the rank of
sergeant. The district court granted the injunction, authorizing, in
place of the examination, interim appointments to the position of
sergeant.8 Members of the plaintiff class were to receive at least
one out of every four such promotions until the combined percentage
1. 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This case is certainly not the first to
deal with the problem of whether a color-conscious approach to civil rights is the
proper remedy. In the past, however, the intentional and official recognition of race
has been found necessary to achieve equal opportunity in a number of areas. These
include the selection of: grand juries, Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966);
tenants for public housing, Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d
1122 (2d Cir. 1973); school administrators, Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1970); and children who are to attend a specific public school, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1971). The plaintiffs could have sued under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1971),
whose coverage was expanded in 1972 to include "any government, governmental
agency or political subdivision," Although it is not entirely clear whether a Title VII
action is more advantageous than one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971),
certain relevant distinctions do exist. For a comparison of the relative advantages,
see Schulman, Employment Discrimination in State and Local Government: Title
VII Amended and Section 1983 Revisited, 34 LA. L. REv. 540, 550-51 (1974).
3. 374 F. Supp. 1361, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court also mandatorily
enjoined the defendants to develop a non-discriminatory selection procedure for the
position of sergeant, requiring that it be validated in accordance with E.E.O.C.
Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures. Furthermore, it required that, if
feasible, all validation studies be performed by means of empirical, criterion-related
validation techniques, and that the proposed selection procedure be submitted to the
plaintiffs for review and to the court for approval prior to its adoption.
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adoption of this, or any similar approach, a court should undertake
an independent analysis of the functional relationships among the
elements of the Rule and attempt to re-evaluate and refine both the
general language and its applicability in specific factual settings.
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES-UsE OF QUOTAS TO REMEDY Dis-
CRIMINATION BY PUBLIC EMPLOYERS-Kirkland v. New York
State Department of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d
Cir. 1975).
In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional
Services,' two Black officers, joined by the Brotherhood of New York
State Corrections Officers, filed suit under sections 1981 and 19832
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enjoin the application of a dis-
criminatory examination used to determine promotion to the rank of
sergeant. The district court granted the injunction, authorizing, in
place of the examination, interim appointments to the position of
sergeant.8 Members of the plaintiff class were to receive at least
one out of every four such promotions until the combined percentage
1. 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This case is certainly not the first to
deal with the problem of whether a color-conscious approach to civil rights is the
proper remedy. In the past, however, the intentional and official recognition of race
has been found necessary to achieve equal opportunity in a number of areas. These
include the selection of: grand juries, Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966);
tenants for public housing, Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d
1122 (2d Cir. 1973); school administrators, Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1970); and children who are to attend a specific public school, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1971). The plaintiffs could have sued under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1971),
whose coverage was expanded in 1972 to include "any government, governmental
agency or political subdivision," Although it is not entirely clear whether a Title VII
action is more advantageous than one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971),
certain relevant distinctions do exist. For a comparison of the relative advantages,
see Schulman, Employment Discrimination in State and Local Government: Title
VII Amended and Section 1983 Revisited, 34 LA. L. REv. 540, 550-51 (1974).
3. 374 F. Supp. 1361, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court also mandatorily
enjoined the defendants to develop a non-discriminatory selection procedure for the
position of sergeant, requiring that it be validated in accordance with E.E.O.C.
Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures. Furthermore, it required that, if
feasible, all validation studies be performed by means of empirical, criterion-related
validation techniques, and that the proposed selection procedure be submitted to the
plaintiffs for review and to the court for approval prior to its adoption.
of black and Hispanic sergeants equalled the combined percentage
of black and Hispanic corrections officers.4 More importantly, the
court ordered the development of new selection procedures in order
to permanently implement the approved ratio.5
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the use of an interim
quota.6 The court held, however, that the imposition of a permanent
quota amounted to constitutionally forbidden reverse discrimination.
7
In addition, the court's opinion used perhaps the strongest "anti-
quota" language of any appellate court.
8
The Second Circuit had on earlier occasions approved the use
of a quota system. For example, Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission,9 upheld the use
of hiring quotas for the Bridgeport Police Department. Similarly,
in Vulcan Society of the New York City Fire Dept. v. Civil Service
Commission,'° a case involving alleged discrimination in the hiring
examination for positions in the New York City Fire Department, the
court approved the use of an interim quota. Their order required
that, pending development of a new examination, one out of every
4. Id. at 1380.
5. Id.
6. The Second Circuit affirmed that part of the district court's holding that
invalidated the promotional examination and directed the preparation of a new non-
discriminatory examination procedure. It also approved the lower court's require-
ment that the new testing procedures be validated by means of empirical, criterion-
related validation techniques, if feasible. The court of appeals did, however, reverse
that part of the district court holding requiring that the new testing procedures be
submitted to the plaintiffs for review. It also reversed the district court's award of
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.
7. 520 F.2d 420, 429 (2d Cir. 1975).
8. The use of quotas as a means of remedying the effects of past discrimina-
tion is a controversial area and has generated a great deal of comment. See, e.g.,
Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions
of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1974); Lowe, Race Quotas As a
Form of Affirmative Action, 34 LA. L. REV. 552 (1974); Sape, The Use of Numerical
Quotas to Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481 (1975);
Note, Constitutionality of Remedial Minority Preferences in Employment, 56 MINN.
L. REV. 842 (1972).
9. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973). This was a suit for injunctive and de-
claratory relief brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiffs
alleged that the hiring examination for policemen in Bridgeport was discriminatory.
The district court enjoined the use of the hiring examination and ordered hiring and
promotional quotas to remedy the effects of past discrimination. On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the use of hiring quotas, but finding insufficient evidence that
the promotional examination was discriminatory, found the district court clearly in
error in ordering that promotional quotas be established. Alternative remedies, such
as decreasing the time in grade requirements and decreasing the weight given to
seniority, gave sufficient relief.
10. 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973). This was a suit under § 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. It was alleged that the written and physical examinations for
positions in the New York City Fire Department were discriminatory. The district
court ordered the development of an interim quota procedure, which, on appeal, was
approved by the Second Circuit. The court stated, however, that it gave such
approval "only because no other method was available for affording appropriate relief
without impairing essential city services." Id. at 398.
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three appointments from the eligibility list be a member of the plain-
tiff minorities. In the private sector, the Second Circuit has also
approved the use of quotas." The instant case, disapproving any
form of permanent quotas, raises the question whether the court
is establishing a new, more conservative approach to permissible
remedies for discrimination by public employers.
Kirkland first distinguished earlier decisions in which it had ap-
proved the use of quotas.
In each of these cases, there was a clear-cut pattern of long-
continued and egregious racial discrimination. In none of them
was there a showing of identifiable reverse discrimination. In
the instant case, there is insufficient proof of -the former and sub-
stantial evidence of the latter.'
2
The court also noted that here they were considering only one exam-
ination, as opposed to earlier cases in which a substantial number
of examinations over a lengthy time period were found discrimina-
tory. For example, in Chance v. Board of Examiners," the district
judge had "reviewed the pass-fail statistics from fifty supervisory ex-
aminations taken by six thousand two hundred one candidates over
a seven year period to ascertain the relevant racial and ethnic
11. See Patterson v. Newspaper Delivers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975)
(approving order of district court judge, setting a goal of 25% minority membership in
a union where the area population percentage was 30%); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n
Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring defendants to achieve
prescribed percentage of nonwhite membership in union and in joint employer-union
apprenticeship program); United States v. Wood Lathers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir. 1973) (approving order that required defendant union to issue some one hun-
dred work permits to minority applicants).
12. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
427 (2d Cir. 1975).
13. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). In Chance, suit was brought under §§ 1981
and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was alleged that competitive examina-
tions given by the Board to those seeking permanent appointments to supervisory
positions in the New York City schools discriminated against blacks and Puerto
Ricans and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
court agreed, and upheld a district court order enjoining the use of Board examina-
tions and lists of eligibles based upon the results of those tests.
A subsequent Second Circuit decision has undoubtedly undermined the import-
ance of this decision. In Chance v. Board of Examiners, 44 U.S.L.W. 2343 (2d Cir.
Jan. 19, 1976), the court of appeals held that a federal district court order imposing
racial quotas upon the New York City school board's lay-off procedure, which
operated on a "last-hired, first-fired" basis, constituted an unlawful form of reverse
discrimination. The court stated, "To require a senior, more experienced white
employee to stand aside and forego the seniority benefits guaranteed him by the New
York Education Law and his union contract solely because a younger, less experi-
enced employee is black or Puerto Rican is constitutionally forbidden reverse discrim-
ination." Id. at 2343.
groups."1 An additional point of distinction was that Kirkland pre-
sented a challenge to a promotional level, as opposed to an entry
level, examination. The use of quotas in a promotional context
raises the specter of reverse discrimination, particularly when their
use means the end of benefits acquired through years of work expe-
rience. This same court had earlier denied the use of a quota in
a promotional context. 15 Finally, in a case involving a private em-
ployer, the court had "suggested that court ordered relief involving
minority employment goals be confined to entry level positions.""'
Kirkland emphasized the importance of the Civil Service
process' 7 and the effect a decree involving quotas would have upon
it. The court felt a conflict existed between the Civil Service Sys-
tem, designed to eliminate the spoils system, and the Civil Rights
Acts, designed to ameliorate discrimination. Noting that Congress
approved the use of bona fide seniority or merit systems in Title
VII,'8 the court held that in this case protection of the civil service
system should prevail.
[T]he judiciary should act with great reluctance in undermining
,traditional civil service concepts; and, if a decision is to be made
to subordinate the social purposes of civil service to those of
equal employment opportunity, that decision should be made
by the people speaking through their legislators. 19
The Second Circuit therefore struck down that part of the district
court holding which established a permanent quota, concluding that,
[s]o long as civil service remains the constitutionally mandated
route to public employment in the State of New York, no one
14. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
428 (2d Cir. 1975).
15. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973). See note 9 supra.
16. Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.
1975). See note 11 supra.
17. The N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1969), provides that
[a]ppointments and promotions in the civil service of this state and all the
civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according
to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination
which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive ...
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1971) provides that "it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system."
19. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
429 (2d Cir. 1975). In Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971),
the court expressed a similar concern about substituting a "subjective" basis for
promotion in place of the "objective" procedure provided by the Civil Service System.
The court stated:
In the name of a 'good cause' the door would again be opened to the spoils
system which has been abolished because the result was 'bad.' It is the sad
history of mankind that about as many evils have come about from the
purportedly 'good' causes as from 'bad' causes. Our protection from the
subjective determination of good and bad is principle to govern our conduct.
In this instance it is the principle of Civil Service including promotion on





should be "bumped" from a preferred position on the eligibility
list solely because of his race. Unless the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is applicable only to Blacks, this is constitutionally forbid-
den reverse discrimination.
20
Other courts have also denied quota relief. In Harper v.
Kloster,21 four black employees of the Baltimore city fire department
brought a class action suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
against allegedly racially discriminatory practices in the appointment
and promotion of firemen. The Fourth Circuit, while invalidating
the written examinations, rejected plaintiffs' argument that per-
manent racial quotas should be established.2 2 The court felt that
sufficient alternative relief had been given by the lower court. This
relief included invalidating existing promotional lists, restricting the
use of existing eligibility tests, invalidating certain accumulated
seniority, and requiring a decrease in the time in grade requirements
for seniority.
Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto23 in-
volved an appeal from an order imposing a temporary hiring ratio
on the San Francisco police department. The Ninth Circuit found
the order moot, since the city had already complied with it. In dicta,
however, it affirmed the trial court's refusal to make the order
permanent.
In Commonwealth v. Glickman,24 a district court case, an action
was brought to enjoin city officials from allegedly engaging in unlaw-
ful racial discrimination in the recruiting and hiring of firefighters.
The court, while holding that a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion was established and that the city officials had failed to show the
written examination was job-related, rejected the use of a racially
oriented hiring quota.2 5 It based this decision on two major factors.
First, in this case there was merely a disparity in representation
between minority individuals and whites, as opposed to zero repre-
sentation for minority group members." Second, the court differ-
20. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
429 (2d Cir. 1975).
21. 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
22. ld. at 1136.
23. 10 F.E.P. 527 (1975).
24. 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
25. The court pointed out that at least three other district courts had rejected
the use of quotas: Harper v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187
(D. Md. 1973); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355
(D. Mass. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
26. 370 F. Supp. 724, 735 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
entiated between police departments and fire departments. In view
of the policeman's higher visibility and continual interaction with the
public, the court considered the need to insure adequate minority
representation on police forces more compelling than in fire depart-
ments.27
The Glickman court also argued that "the school integration
cases are not precedent for compelling public employers to hire on
a racial basis:"
128
Such a conclusion is at odds with the meaning and intent
of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act clearly prohibits all hiring
on the basis of race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964). Under the
Act, no minority group member may be discriminated against
or hired on the basis of race. Moreover, unless the Fourteenth
Amendment is applicable only to blacks, a highly questionable
proposition on its face, it too serves to mandate colorblindness
in hiring. Insofar as racial preference hiring quotas deny em-
ployment to qualified persons of other races, they compel re-
verse discrimination. If any racial classification is constitution-
ally objectionable in and of itself, then no governmental purpose,
even the eradication of racial discrimination and its effects,
can justify the imposition of racially oriented hiring quotas.2 9
The court's harsh language is, however, deceptive. In refusing to
maintain continuing jurisdiction, the court stressed the great strides
which the defendants had already made in ameliorating their dis-
crimination. The court also emphasized that if defendants failed to
comply with the terms of the court order, they would not hesitate
to impose a quota.
A number of other circuits have applied quotas to achieve racial
equality. In each case, however, the court has used language indi-
cating that their use must be approached carefully.
In Carter v. Gallagher,8" a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned a district court order requiring that absolute
preference be given to twenty minority members who met the
27. Id. This rationale serves mainly as a basis for distinguishing two earlier
cases wherein this same court had approved the use of hiring quotas. In Erie Human
Relations Comm'n. v. Tullio, 360 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Pa. 1973), the court had
directed that one qualified black candidate be hired by the Erie police department for
each qualified white candidate. This procedure was to continue until ten black
candidates were hired and the racial representation of the police force was roughly
aligned with the racial representation in the city. Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Sebastian, 368 F. Supp. 854 (W.D. Pa. 1972), afrd per curiam, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1973), the court, finding a case of de facto racial discrimination, issued an injunction
permitting the defendant township to hire six additional policemen, provided one of
those six was black.
28. Commonwealth v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 735-36 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court held that the limited use of mathematical ratios was a proper
means of remedying discrimination in a public school system.
29. Id. at 736.
30. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
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requirements of the examination for a position in the Minneapolis
fire department. The court stated:
Under ,the charter and the civil services provisions properly ad-
ministered, preference is to be accorded to the fire fighter appli-
cant having the highest rating. Under the court's minority
preference position, a white person who, in a subsequently con-
ducted examination fairly conducted and free of racial discrim-
ination, obtains a higher rating than a minority person is denied
employment solely because he is a white man. The fact that
some unnamed and unknown white person in the distant past
may, by reason of past racial discrimination in which the present
applicant in no way participated, have received preference over
some unidentified minority person with higher qualifications is
no justification for discriminating against the present better qual-
ified applicant upon the basis of race.
3 1
On rehearing en banc,' 2 however, the court reversed itself, requiring
recruitment in the ratio of one minority group applicant for each two
white applicants until at least twenty minority group applicants were
hired. The court felt that
some reasonable ratio for hiring minority persons who can
qualify under the revised qualification standards is in order for
a limited period of -time, or until there is a fair approximation of
minority representation consistent with the population mix in
the area.33
While the court asserted that such a procedure did not constitute a
"quota" system, such an assertion appears to be mainly a matter of
semantics. For all practical purposes, the Eighth Circuit imposed
a quota, regardless of the name used to characterize it.
The Third Circuit also has had occasion to consider the use of
quotas. In Commonwealth v. O'Neill,4 suit was brought under Sec-
tions 1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 challenging the
hiring and promotion policies of the Philadelphia police department.
The district court3 5 granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting hir-
ing or promotion except in a ratio approximating the proportion of
black applicants for employment and black population in the city.
A panel of the Third Circuit, however, overturned both the hiring
and promotion ratios.3 6 Sitting en banc, the court affirmed the
panel's decision that a preliminary injunction could not be granted
31. Id. at 325.
32. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
33. Id. at 330.
34. 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
35. 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
36. 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1972).
as to the promotional ratio.37  But, an equally divided court did
affirm those provisions of the lower court order dealing with the hir-
ing procedures.
The same court, in Oburn v. Shapp,38 denied a preliminary
injunction that would have banned the continued use of racial hiring
quotas by the Pennsylvania state police. White applicants for the
position of state trooper alleged that the use of racial quotas discrimi-
nated against them. The court, however, accepted defendant's con-
tention "that their interest in offsetting prior racially discriminatory
practices and the effects of such practices, constitutes a remedial pur-
pose sufficient to warrant the use of racial quotas."39
Two other circuits have approved the use of quotas to remedy
discrimination by public employers. In Castro v. Beecher,4° black
and Spanish-surnamed individuals alleged constitutional defects in
the recruitment and hiring practices of the Boston police department.
The First Circuit, accepting plaintiffs allegations, ordered the follow-
ing compensatory relief. A new, validated examination was to be
made available to all applicants. Black and Spanish-surnamed appli-
cants who passed this examination after failing the defective tests
were to be placed in a priority pool. Another pool was to be created
consisting of those already on present eligibility lists, and those who
passed the new exam but did not qualify for the priority pool.
Thereafter, appointments to the police department were to be made
according to a ratio to be set by the district court until the priority
pool was exhausted.
Suit was brought in Morrow v. Crisler" to enjoin racial dis-
crimination in the employment and working conditions of the Missis-
sippi Highway Patrol. The district court42 gave declaratory and in-
junctive relief, and a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed."3 On rehearing
en banc, the court declared this relief, molded in the form of an
"affirmative recruitment program," to be inadequate. It therefore
remanded the case to the district court to "fashion an appropriate
decree that will have the certain result of increasing the number of
blacks on the Highway Patrol."" The appeals court stated that the
district court "may, within the bounds of discretion, order temporary
one-to-one or one-to-two hiring, the creation of hiring pools, or a
37. The court stated that there was no evidence of either the statistical
significance of the figures relied on by the district court or the passing ratios for other
promotional examinations.
38. 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 150.
40. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
41. 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
42. See 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. 479 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1973).
44. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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freeze on white hiring, or any other form of affirmative hiring relief
until the Patrol is effectively integrated.
45
The courts have now reached a crucial phase in the area of
employment activities. A large and well-defined body of case law
has developed, lending guidance to the determination of what con-
stitutes a "discriminatory hiring or promotional practice." In the
area of remedies, however, the case law remains somewhat uncer-
tain. Nevertheless, the following assertions appear to be accurate.
First, courts are not reluctant to impose entry level quotas.
This is true of the Second Circuit, as well as the other appellate
courts discussed earlier. In the private employer context, the courts,
in Title VII actions, 46 and in suits challenging plans developed under
executive order 11246, 4 7 have similarly approved the use of entry
level quotas. While Commonwealth v. Glickman4 a and Harper v.
Kloster49 seemingly stand apart in denying the use of quotas at the
entry level, in both cases there was adequate evidence that suffici-
ent alternative relief was available. Moreover, there is little doubt
45. Id. at 1056.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1971), provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-manage-
ment committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of such individual or group ....
The courts have consistently held that this section is not violated by the use of
quotas. Their position has been that
[w]hen the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief au-
thorization . . . [of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1964)] are read in context with
§ 2000e-2(j), we believe that section cannot be construed as a ban on af-
firmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination result-
ing from present practices (neutral on their face) which have the practical
effect of continuing past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the
stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970). See also
United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Local 53
Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
47. Executive Order 11,246 (reported in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1971)
as part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act) required that contractors on
federally funded jobs insure that employers and applicants are treated without regard
to race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Subsequently, a number of local plans
were developed to assure compliance with the order. Many of these plans instituted
various "affirmative action" programs, all of which were upheld when challenged. See
Associated General Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1973); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Con-
tractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971);
Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907
(1969).
48. 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
49. 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
that in both cases the courts would have resorted to quotas had the
public employer defendants failed to comply with the court orders.
The majority of courts have recognized that some form of affirmative
action at the entry level is necessary. 50
At the promotional level, however, the courts have uniformly
denied the use of quotas. In this respect, the Second Circuit in
Kirkland is in accord with prior case law. The basic rationale under-
lying this result is that a promotional level quota conflicts with the
Civil Service System. In addition, applying a quota in such a situa-
tion could result in the destruction of years of seniority built up by
white employees, fostering resentment to civil rights activity. There-
fore, it is certain that at the promotional level quotas "should not be
employed merely because of [their] ease of application or monitoring;
to do so can only foster antagonism that will hinder unnecessarily
the drive for equal employment opportunity."'
Finally, in denying a permanent quota, the Second Circuit in
Kirkland was again in accord with prior case law. The courts will
generally allow a temporary quota to be utilized pending the
development of non-discriminatory hiring or promotional criteria.
Once the new procedure is developed, however, the need for a quota
system ceases. This result is entirely proper. For if the new pro-
cedure is truly non-discriminatory, then both minority and non-
minority applicants stand an equal chance of successfully meeting the
employment criteria.
50. As one author has stated,
[tihe 'color blindness' approach undoubtedly did not achieve full compliance
with the law; historical patterns of discrimination had produced longstand-
ing inequities requiring specific recognition of the underutilization of mi-
nority groups to be programmed into any remedial action. Numerically
based systems provided a logical solution.
Sape, The Use of Numerical Quotas to Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 481, 485 (1975).
51. Id. at 506.
[Casenote by James M. Home]
CIVIL RIGHTS-ATTORNEYS' FEES-PREVAILING DEFENDANT IN
ACTION UNDER TITLE VII OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 MAY
RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES. United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975)
The courts have routinely awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiffs
who prevail in actions brought under the Equal Employment Oppor-
that in both cases the courts would have resorted to quotas had the
public employer defendants failed to comply with the court orders.
The majority of courts have recognized that some form of affirmative
action at the entry level is necessary. 50
At the promotional level, however, the courts have uniformly
denied the use of quotas. In this respect, the Second Circuit in
Kirkland is in accord with prior case law. The basic rationale under-
lying this result is that a promotional level quota conflicts with the
Civil Service System. In addition, applying a quota in such a situa-
tion could result in the destruction of years of seniority built up by
white employees, fostering resentment to civil rights activity. There-
fore, it is certain that at the promotional level quotas "should not be
employed merely because of [their] ease of application or monitoring;
to do so can only foster antagonism that will hinder unnecessarily
the drive for equal employment opportunity."'
Finally, in denying a permanent quota, the Second Circuit in
Kirkland was again in accord with prior case law. The courts will
generally allow a temporary quota to be utilized pending the
development of non-discriminatory hiring or promotional criteria.
Once the new procedure is developed, however, the need for a quota
system ceases. This result is entirely proper. For if the new pro-
cedure is truly non-discriminatory, then both minority and non-
minority applicants stand an equal chance of successfully meeting the
employment criteria.
50. As one author has stated,
[tihe 'color blindness' approach undoubtedly did not achieve full compliance
with the law; historical patterns of discrimination had produced longstand-
ing inequities requiring specific recognition of the underutilization of mi-
nority groups to be programmed into any remedial action. Numerically
based systems provided a logical solution.
Sape, The Use of Numerical Quotas to Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 481, 485 (1975).
51. Id. at 506.
[Casenote by James M. Home]
CIVIL RIGHTS-ATTORNEYS' FEES-PREVAILING DEFENDANT IN
ACTION UNDER TITLE VII OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 MAY
RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES. United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975)
The courts have routinely awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiffs
who prevail in actions brought under the Equal Employment Oppor-
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tunity provisions' of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The awards have
been made pursuant to section 706(k) of the Act, which provides
that
[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs, and -the Commission and the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.8
Only recently, however, have prevailing defendants sought to utilize
the fee-shifting provision. In United States Steel Corp. v. United
States,4 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the
section empowers courts to award attorney's fees against the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), fees should be
awarded only if a plaintiff's conduct has been unreasonable.
Alvin Bowen, an employee of U.S. Steel, filed a charge with the
EEOC on January 30, 1970, alleging racial discrimination 5 by his
employer. On November 26, 1971, the EEOC issued a "Demand for
Access"' 6 to ten documents containing information regarding the plant
in which Mr. Bowen was employed. U.S. Steel petitioned7 the west-
ern district court of Pennsylvania to set aside the "Demand." The
EEOC entered a cross-petition 8 seeking enforcement of its "De-
mand," and both parties moved for summary judgment.9 The dis-
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 76 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. II, 1972). For excellent textual analyses of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, see C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
(1971); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-RESPONSIBIU.TIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES
(J. Pemberton ed. 1975); 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
2. See note 49 and accompanying text infra.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
4. 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975), affg, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in hiring or employ-
ment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1970).
6. The Commission is empowered to gain access to any evidence relevant to
an investigation of alleged unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)
(1970).
7. At the time, the petition procedure for setting aside a "Demand" was
governed by Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 710(c), 78 Stat. 264.
The procedure has been modified by the 1972 amendments. See note 9 infra.
8. After the "Demand" of the Commission had been challenged, the Govern-
ment could petition the court for a compliance order under Act of July 2, 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 710(b), 78 Stat. 264. The procedure has been modified by
the 1972 amendments. See note 9 infra.
9. As the court noted, pursuant to the 1972 amendments to § 710, Commis-
sion investigations are now governed by § 11 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 161 (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. II, 1972). See 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137 (1972).
trict court ordered access to only two items, and modified the "De-
mand" as to one of them."0  The order was affirmed on appeal."
U.S. Steel then petitioned for attorneys' fees and costs. The district
court held that section 706(k) sanctions an award of attorneys' fees
to a defendant who prevails in a Title VII action, but that U.S. Steel
was not entitled to an award because the action was neither "brought
to harass, embarrass or abuse either the petitioner or the enforcement
process" nor was it "unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vexatiously
brought."' 2 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, approving
both the construction of section 706(k) and the indicia of discretion
adopted by the lower court. 3
Both issues considered by the court in United States Steel have a
deep background in American law. Although in England attorneys'
fees are routinely taxed in favor of a prevailing party, the Supreme
Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 4 declared that "[t]he general prac-
tice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the
respect of this court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute."' 5 The
federal courts, however, have exercised their traditional equitable
power' 6 to make discretionary awards of attorneys' fees in certain
cases. Attorneys' fees have been awarded to the prevailing party
when he has created or preserved a fund which will benefit others as
well as himself,' 7 when the opposing party has willfully disobeyed a
10. It is interesting to note that the only item to which the court ordered full
access had already been provided by U.S. Steel to the EEOC. Brief for Appellant at
6, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975).
11. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973).
12. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa.
1974).
13. 519 F.2d at 359. The court reached this conclusion despite its acknowl-
edgment of the claim made by U.S. Steel that Bowen's grievance had been resolved
before the court action was instituted. Id. at 364 n.25.
14. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
15. Id.; accord, Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
The Supreme Court in Arcambel alluded to the questionable underpinnings of
the rule. In recent years the principle has undergone considerable scrutiny, with
many writers advocating its abandonment. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963);
McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1931); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636
(1974); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L.
REV. 1216 (1967).
16. In Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939), the Court
stated that "[aillowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part of the historic
equity jurisdiction of the federal courts."
17. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
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court order,'8 or when the losing party has acted in bad faith or with
a vexatious or wanton motive.' In addition, Congress has enacted
numerous statutory exceptions to the "American rule."
20
There is a statutory prohibition, however, against taxation of
attorneys' fees against the United States.2 Such an award may only
be made pursuant to a specific statutory provision.
22  U.S. Steel
contended that section 706(k)2" was such an enactment and entitled
it, as the "prevailing party, ' 24 to recover its attorney's fees from the
EEOC. 21 The wording of the provision clearly permits an award of
attorneys' fees against a private plaintiff. The EEOC did not dispute
this, 26 but claimed that the legislative history of the section indicates
18. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
19. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Vaughn
v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
20. There are numerous attorneys' fees provisions, the language of which may
be mandatory or discretionary. See Annot., 8 L. ED. 2d 894 (1963). The following
are similar to § 706(k) because they vest discretion in the court: Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. 1976); Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. §§ 641-644 (1970); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Trust
Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. II, 1972); Ocean Dumping Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. II, 1972); 33 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) (patent infringe-
ment); Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970); Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)
(1970); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
21. Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the
fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party
in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency
or official of the United States acting in his official capacity, in any court
having jurisdiction of such action ...
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
22. Id.; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926); Georg
Jensen, Inc. v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Aycrigg v.
United States, 124 F. Supp. 416, 417-18 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
24. EEOC did not pursue the argument on appeal that U.S. Steel was not the
"prevailing party," although the district court set aside only eight of ten "Demands"
issued by EEOC. 519 F.2d at 363 n.15; see note 10 and accompanying text supra.
Within the context of § 706(k) the courts have adopted prior definitions of "prevail-
ing party." E.g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 F.E.P. Cases 244, 246-47 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); United States v. Operating Eng'rs, 6 F.E.P. Cases 984, 985 (N.D. Cal.
1973); see also S.A. Hirsh Mfg. Co. v. Childs, 157 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Pa. 1957); 6
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 54.70[4] (2d ed. 1976).
25. Brief for Appellant at 9-18, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519
F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. "[Slection 706(k) allows courts discretion to award reasonable attorneys'
fees to prevailing parties, plaintiff or defendant, as part of the costs." 7 EEOC ANN.
REP,. 19 (1972).
that Congress did not intend to provide for the taxation of counsel
fees against the United States or the EEOC.
27
The statutory definition of the term "costs" does not include
attorneys' fees s.2  A precise understanding of the word, as it is used
in section 706(k), 9 is important because it appears in two contexts.
The statute provides first that a prevailing party may be awarded "a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," and second, that
"the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person."30 The fee-shifting portion of the provision
was inserted by a Senate amendment to the House version, which had
merely allowed the assessment of "costs" against the Commission."'
The Commission argued that because the Senate did not explicitly
include attorneys' fees as part of the "costs" for which the government
may be liable, Congress did not intend such a result. Although the
legislative history of the provision is sparse,3 2 the Commission's argu-
ment is untenable in light of the plain wording of the statute. In
United States Steel, the court followed the sound logic of the Ninth
Circuit, which, when confronted with the same argument in Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp.,33 concluded that "[u]nless the meaning
of 'costs' changes during the eleven words which separate its two
usages, it is clear that attorney's fees can be assessed against the
Commission. ' 4
27. Brief for Appellee at 5, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d
359 (3d Cir. 1975).
28. By statute "costs" are defined as the fees of the clerk and marshall, the fees
of the court reporter for necessary transcripts, the fees for printing and witnesses, the
fees for necessary exemplifications and copies of papers, and docket fees, under 28
U.S.C. § 1923 (1970). 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970); see also Twentieth Cent. Films
Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 222-24 (9th Cir. 1964).
29. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
31. In the House bill this section provided that "[in any action or proceeding
under this title the Commission shall be liable for costs the same as a private person."
The Dirksen-Mansfield-Kuchel-Humphrey amendment passed by the Senate resulted
in the present form of section 706(k). 110 CONG. REc. 11933, 12807, 12814, 12819
(1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen); 110 CONG. Rc. 12706 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey).
32. Speaking in favor of the Dirksen-Mansfield-Kuchel-Humphrey amendment,
Senator Humphrey stated, "This should make it easier for a plaintiff of limited
means to bring a meritorious suit." 110 CONG. REc. 12724 (1964). After the
attorneys' fees provision had been added, Senator Ervin offered an amendment to
strike it from the section. In the colloquy that followed, Senator Pastore pointed
out that another purpose of the provision is "to discourage frivolous suits ...
When a person realizes that he takes the chance of having attorney's fees assessed
against him if he does not prevail, he will deliberate before he brings suit." 110
CONG. REc. 14214 (1964).
33. 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. Id. at 1132. The same result had been reached in an earlier case. In
United States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 316 F. Supp. 567 (M.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972), the
district court concluded that
28 U.S.C. § 2412 is not a statutory prohibition to the award of attorneys'
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The result reached by the court is supported by considerations
other than the logical construction of section 706(k). First, Title
H" of the Civil Rights Act, which deals with discrimination in public
accommodations, contains a virtually identical fee-shifting provi-
sion. 6 United States v. Gray7 held that this provision authorized an
award of attorneys' fees against the Government. Second, taxation of
attorneys' fees against the EEOC is not inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, if an agency of the government
violates Title VII, 8 the courts will invoke section 706(k) to award
attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff.3 9 Furthermore, Title III
provides for a mandatory award of attorneys' fees as part of the costs
against the United States should the defendant prevail.40 The allow-
ance of attorneys' fees to a successful defendant 4' in an action insti-
tuted by the EEOC is justified by both statutory construction of sec-
tion 706(k) and by decisions interpreting other provisions of the Act.
The second issue before the court in United States Steel was the
formulation of a standard for granting or denying an award of
attorneys' fees. Because the statute allows an award by "the court, in
its discretion,"42 it was necessary that the court create guidelines for
fees against the United States, for the reason that Section 706(k) . . .
specifically provides that the United States may be liable for attorney's
fees, in the discretion of the Court, as part of the costs awarded the pre-
vailing party to the action.
Id. at 623; accord, EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086,
1096 (6th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 699 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (dictum).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
36. In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
37. 319 F. Supp. 871 (D.R.I. 1970).
38. Prior to 1972 governmental agencies could not be sued for violations of
Title VII. The 1972 amendments, however, redefined "employer" to include "govern-
ments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a),
(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
39. E.g., Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975); Smith v.
Fletcher, 393 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145
(N.D. Tex. 1974); Smith v. Kleindienst, 8 F.E.P. Cases 752 (D.D.C. 1974).
40. "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the United States shall
be liable for costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, the same as a private
person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (1970).
41. The court acknowledged the "asymmetry" of the result it reached. While
an employer may recover attorneys' fees as part of costs against the government,
attorneys' fees cannot be assessed in favor of the United States or the Commission.
519 F.2d at 362. This is not, however, an unusual statutory provision. Section 4 of
the Clayton Act provides for a mandatory award of counsel fees to a prevailing
plaintiff, but a defendant can never recover such fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
42. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
exercising its discretion. Prior case law offered little guidance. 43 The
district court applied traditional equitable principles 44 and denied
defendant's request because the suit was neither meritless nor vexa-
tiously instituted. 41 An early decision 46 applied similar standards in
denying an award to a prevailing plaintiff in a Title II action. In
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,47 however, the Supreme Court
concluded that because a Title II plaintiff vindicates statutory and
public policy by successfully litigating his case, he should recover
attorneys' fees "unless special circumstances render such an award
unjust."' 4" The "private attorney general" status of plaintiffs has
been recognized in Title VII actions as well, and courts routinely
allow attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 9
Unlike his adversary in a civil rights case, a defendant "does not
appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest." 0 The
cases which regularly award counsel fees to successful plaintiffs,
therefore, are of questionable authority in formulating a standard for
cases in which defendants prevail. U.S. Steel urged that because as a
practical matter defendants do not have access to the information
43. In Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 596, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the
court stated in dictum, "Such an award would normally be made to prevailing de-
fendants only if the case had been unreasonably brought .... ." Similarly, in
Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Amer., 332 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D. La. 1971), the
court summarily rejected defendant's request for counsel fees, stating that "[p]laintiff
proceeded in good faith on the advice of competent counsel to attempt to vindicate
statutory rights." U.S. Steel argued that these cases were distinguishable from its
case because they each involved a private plaintiff, not the government. Brief for
Appellant at 26, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.
1975). This contention is persuasive in light of the emphasis that courts have placed
upon the "David and Goliath" confrontation that normally occurs in litigation be-
tween private parties. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998,
1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
45. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
46. Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
47. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The Newman court reasoned:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that en-
forcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely
in part upon the private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance
with the law. . . . When a plaintiff brings an action under . . . Title
[H1], he .. .does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney
general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority.
Id. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 402.
49. Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Reed v.
Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973);
Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Miller v. Amusement Enter., Inc., 426 F.2d 534
(5th Cir. 1970); see Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Proceedings and
Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 495, 501-06 (1966); Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAv. L. REv. 1009,
1253-56 (1971); Comment, Allowance of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7
COLUM. J. of L. & Soc. PROB. 381, 390-97 (1971).
50. .519 F.2d at 364.
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necessary to prove improper Commission motives, the court should
reject the "bad faith" test and instead consider factors such as the
economic and legal resources of the EEOC and the potential -for'
abuse of its powers. 1
The court's rejection of the novel standard proposed by defend-
ant52 is justified for several reasons. First, in order to apply the test
formulated by U.S. Steel the court must consider the relative financial
and legal resources of the Commission and the employer. This
approach has been rejected by both the courts and Congress. In Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 3 the courts stated: "[W]e do not con-
clude that Xerox's ability to pay is necessarily a bar to an award in
its favor." 54  Conversely, Congress has rejected a standard based
upon a defendant's relative inability to litigate. During the debate
concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Senator
Mondale proposed an amendment to section 706(k). The proposal
provided for mandatory awards of attorneys' fees to small businesses
and labor organizations that asserted a successful defense. 5  Al-
though the amendment was adopted by the Senate," it was deleted by
the Conference Committee. 57  The refusal of Congress to adopt the
provision, which would have linked allowance of counsel fees to a
defendant's ability to litigate, is persuasive legislative authority for the
continued application of traditional equitable principles.58
Second, section 706(k) is not the only fee-shifting statute that
vests discretion in the court.5 9 The criteria that have been adopted
by the courts, in the exercise of their discretionary power, are equity
51. Brief for Appellant at 27-29, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519
F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975).
52. 519 F.2d at 363.
53. 503 F.2d 1131 (9thCir. 1974).
54. Id. at 1133.
55. The amendment provided that 'a prevailing employer or labor union that
had less than twenty-five employees or members would be indemnified for costs and
attorneys' fees not exceeding $5,000. An employer with between twenty-five and one
hundred employees whose average income is less than $7,500, or a labor organization
with between twenty-five and one hundred members, would have been entitled to one-
half the cost of its defense up to $2,500 if it prevailed. 118 CONG. REc. 1844 (1972)
(remarks by Senator Mondale). See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 2183
(1972); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 878-79 (1972).
56. 118 Cong. Rec. 1847 (1972).
57. Other than stating that "[t]he Senate receded," the committee report gave
no explanation for the omission. S. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1972).
58. Although the Third Circuit did not develop this point in its opinion, it was
considered in the lower court decision. 385 F. Supp. at 348-49.
59. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
standards."' By way of analogy, in copyright infringement proceed-
ings, courts refuse to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant if
the plaintiff has proceeded in good faith.8' Similarly, a successful de-
fendant in an action under the Public Accommodations title 2 of the
Civil Rights Act will be allowed counsel fees only if the government's
case is meritless.6s Thus, the criteria applied by the courts under
similar discretionary fee-shifting provisions support the test adopted
by the court in United States Steel.
Last, by adopting traditional equitable considerations as the
guide for awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant, the court
reached a symmetrical result.64 The same test is applied regardless of
which party is seeking allowance of counsel fees. By winning the
case and thereby advancing the public policy against discrimination, a
successful plaintiff gains the favor of equity.6 5 A prevailing defend-
ant, who is not cloaked in the same veil of public interest, however,
must independently arouse the conscience of the court. This can
only be done by showing that he has been forced into court by a
vexatious, meritless claim.66  This approach both encourages plain-
tiffs to vindicate their civil rights and discourages bad faith prosecu-
tion of cases by either private plaintiffs or the Commission. 67
Nearly a decade passed after the enactment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 before defendants sought to utilize the fee-
shifting provision of the statute. Their efforts met strong resistance
by the EEOC that momentarily clouded the plain meaning of section
706(k). In United States Steel, however, the court clarified the
meaning of the provision with a logical interpretation, supported by
legislative history. A successful defendant in a Title VII action may
recover attorneys' fees from either a private plaintiff or the govern-
ment if the proceeding was instituted in bad faith. The principles
espoused by the court are a practicable balance" between the com-
peting interests generated in a civil rights case.
60. 519 F.2d at 363.
61. E.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Continental Record Co., 222 F.2d
488 (2d Cir. 1955); Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 910 (1953).
62. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
63. United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871 (D.R.I. 1970); see 385 F. Supp. at
347.
64. 519 F.2d at 364.
65. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
66. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 32 and 43 and accompanying text supra.
68. The equitable considerations adopted by the court as the indicia of discre-
tion to be exercised under § 706(k) are a workable test with which the federal courts
are familiar. E.g., EEOC v. C. & D. Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga.
1975); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 397 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lee v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975); Matyi v. Beer Bottlers
Local 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
[Casenote by John A. Rodgers]
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